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ABSTRACT
 
This article examines the impact of contemporary business practices within the Amer-
ican business system on established patterns of industrial relations (IR) management
in European subsidiaries of US multinationals, specifically how established firm-level
settlements for the management of IR may or may not combine with host-country
effects to constrain such innovations. The empirical material leads us to evaluate
subsidiaries of US multinationals as a contingent factor indicating that institutional
effects at the level of the national business system are likely to be more embedded than
 
the effects of ownership on employment and IR at firm level.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
In our contribution to last year’s review we sought to examine the impact of contem-
porary business practices within the American business system (ABS) on established
patterns of industrial relations (IR) management in British subsidiaries of US multi-
national corporations (MNCs), specifically how established firm-level settlements for
IR management may or may not combine with host-country effects to constrain such
innovations (Clark and Almond, 2004). This year we seek to examine this argument
on a more pan-European basis by comparing and contrasting our arguments and
findings with those of our colleagues in Ireland and Germany. In so doing we present
our material on two levels, first, at the level of the European business system (EBS)
and second, at the level of the firm. This approach enables us to examine the extent
to which the EBS must react to the growing pressures of internationalisation that
might force it towards a more Americanised approach to IR management.
We were prompted to examine this issue in the light of some of the contributions
to last year’s review that evaluate what the EBS is for while suggesting that its
restructuring and reinvigoration is leading the European model to converge on the
American model (Edwards, 2004; Grahl and Teague, 2004; Jones and Bacon, 2004).
This is important because the institutionalist literature drawn on by these contributors
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and other commentators, for example, Gospel and Pendleton (2003) and Hutton
(2002), emphasises the social embeddedness of national business systems and associ-
ated market institutions (in some cases supported by empirical material). This argu-
ment suggests that while the EBS retains much integrity it is in some ways acceding
to internationalised pressures for change originating in the ABS. However, at a less
abstract more grounded level some of our empirical material suggests that a tendency
towards more contemporary aspects of Americanisation (downsizing, more deter-
mined short-termism and a less restrained pursuit of shareholder value), may be
evident in the management of IR in European subsidiaries of US MNCs. More
significantly, however, it may be the case that Americanisation is more evident in the
management of managers particularly in the German business system. This assertion
leads us in our empirical contribution to evaluate the presence of subsidiaries of US
MNCs as a contingent factor that indicates why it is necessary to underpin the EBS
and its associated social model. This is the case because broad institutional effects at
the level of the national business system are likely to be more embedded than the
effects of ownership on employment and IR at firm level, however, without recognising
this the EBS may be in danger of being undermined by the spillover effects of US
MNCs from the bottom-up. This spillover is evident in the apparent efficiency effects
of US MNCs, for example, centralised, formalised and standardised approaches to
IR management which become best practice templates for indigenous firms. Here the
country-of-origin effect associated with US MNCs represents not only innovation in
host nations but also is an ‘efficiency’ threat to more established and equitable patterns
of IR therein. That is, country-of-origin effects are contingent on the overall institu-
tional setting in a host country.
Theoretically, a tendency towards Americanisation across the EBS is dependent on
several transfer mechanisms but as we suggest not all of these are necessarily grounded
in the contemporary activities of US MNCs. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify
three institutional transfer mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive
mechanisms dictate that management in indigenous firms in a particular sector must
compare their performance against subsidiaries of US MNCs and these comparisons
may lead to mimetic pressures to directly copy their practices or benchmark against
them. In addition to this, normative transfer mechanisms also relate to contemporary
best practice whereby practices associated with US MNCs may become part of man-
agement rhetoric, for example, the importance of cost containment and shareholder
value. More subtly the emergent process of institutional isomorphism entails the
assumed presence of structural and organisational equivalence whereby the adoption
of similar practices (coercion, mimetics to best practice) at the level of the firm or a
sector in the EBS may achieve similar results to those found in the ABS. However,
these firm-level pressures exist separately from competitive isomorphism at the level
of the system which necessarily assumes the presence of more market-orientated
competition—the tendency towards Americanisation. This is the case because the
nature of the mix between institutional isomorphism (firm-level change management)
and competitive isomorphism (system-level change) has a significant impact on the
nature of the transfer process, its speed and the scope of adaptation in the host
model—the EBS. Therein local isomorphic factors such as European Union (EU)
Directives are significant in shaping IR practices that may be at odds with features of
the ABS that now appear as emergent best practice more globally, for example, the
market for corporate control and variable pay for senior managers linked to share
price performance. As we argue while the pressures for competitive isomorphism are
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496 Ian Clark 
 
et al.
 
undeniable the perceived necessity of more market-orientated competition in the EBS
is problematic for two reasons, first as managerial rhetoric or even a catch-all term
for change it may be ahead of the empirical findings and second, it assumes that by
becoming more Americanised the EBS can more effectively compete with the ABS.
(The recent rejection of the EU Constitution by French and Dutch voters in part
demonstrates this point.) While this may or may not be the case, the implication of
this second argument is that more radical adjustments are the most likely outcome
whereas empirical studies confirm this in some sectors (e.g. Royle, 2004) multi-sector
studies are more able to assess the pace and level of diffusion of contemporary
business and IR practices associated with the ABS. Following on from these introduc-
tory arguments 
 
The Americanisation of the EBS
 
 examines the Americanisation of the
EBS as competitive isomorphism whereas 
 
Americanisation, Europeanisation and firm-
level IR systems
 
 draws on pan-European material to evaluate the extent of institutional
isomorphism in firm-level IR systems. This part of the article questions the extent to
which coercive and mimetic pressures may actually result in normative pressures at
the level of the system that move towards the competitive adoption of shareholder
value approaches and the attendant ‘downsize and distribute’ model emphasised by
O’Sullivan (2000). 
 
Americanisation or Europeanisation? Change, innovation and inter-
nationalisation in EBSs
 
 discusses the issues of innovation and internationalisation in
the EBS in a more critical light and is followed by our conclusions.
 
THE AMERICANISATION OF THE EBS
 
In their editorial contribution to last year’s review the editors posed the question of
what the EU and the process of Europeanisation is actually for, rhetorically they
suggest that the emergence of a fledgling EBS is essential to prevent the Balkanisation
of national interpretations of the European model. Highlighting the Lisbon strategy
that aims to see the EU become the world’s leading ‘knowledge economy’ by 2010
Jones and Bacon (2004) imply that the promotion of lifelong learning and high-quality
jobs aims to improve the performance of flawed national economies within the EU as
well as controlling the less restrained activities of MNCs.
The question that follows on from this answer centres on the capability of the
fledgling EBS to deliver on the Lisbon strategy and unify divergent political permis-
siveness in national economies towards MNCs, US MNCs in particular. For as
Edwards (2004: 533) argues the process of restructuring and reinvigoration within the
EBS demonstrates the tendency towards competitive isomorphism as Europe con-
verges on Anglo-American approaches. Citing Lane (2003) Edwards highlights the
diffusion of competitive pressures that witness the changing nature of stakeholder
interests in the German economy whereby the growth of small- to medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) (the Mittelstand sector), foreign institutional investment and the
rhetoric of shareholder value appear to be changing the nature of stakeholder interests
towards the short-term imperative. Here the systematic constraints within the German
business system around which the EBS is modelled appear to be weakened by the
introduction of Anglo-American-type incentives for management particularly in
SMEs. These arguments are similar to those of Jacoby (2000) who explicitly concludes
that coordinated market economies in Europe are converging towards the more liberal
market-orientated American model. Similarly, while a third contribution to last year’s
review suggests that the European elite are losing faith in the German and European
model (Grahl and Teague, 2004: 561) it remains an open question as to whether the
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pattern of competitive pathway adjustment in the EBS will arrive at a more homo-
genous pattern of IR and work organisation be it tending towards Americanisation
or a more determinedly European approach akin to the Lisbon strategy that empha-
sises employability through lifelong learning and development and a consequent
modernisation of work organisation via national action plans.
 
Americanisation vs. Europeanisation
 
At the abstract level industrial capitalism is a system of economic rationality that
assumes the unrestrained presence of private property, the market mechanism and
associated price signals and free contracting incentivised by the efficiency bias of profit
maximisation. However, industrial capitalism is grounded by the reality of historically
derived national patterns of capitalism and attendant national business systems.
National business systems have a pattern of institutional grounding in financial sys-
tems, legal systems, IR systems, patterns of contractual regulation and national cul-
ture, all of which contribute to the institutional relationship between stakeholders such
as capital, labour and the state.
In the contemporary period two models of industrial organisation predominate, the
ABS centred on market-led institutions—
 
the liberal market economy
 
—perhaps closer
to the abstract model outlined above and the European model that emphasises more
coordination within and between institutions—
 
the coordinated market economy
 
, each
with its own associated social model of the economy and society (Hall and Soskice,
2001: Chapter 1). Critics of American capitalism and the ABS see the USA as a
hegemonic ‘hyper power’ (Hutton, 2002: Chapter 1; Vedrine and Moisi, 2001). Now
unrestrained by the previous edicts of the Cold War American dominance, its prior-
ities, interests and values permeate and impact on and become part of other economic
and social models such as in the apparent endemic tendency towards competitive
isomorphism, leading some to argue that the Lisbon strategy aims not to arrest
Americanisation but to promote it (Hutton, 2002: 15). A complicating factor in this
tendency is that the EBS encompasses a continent and not a country, wherein indi-
vidual nation states guard, protect, amend and change embedded values and associ-
ated institutional infrastructures and associated social models on the basis of a variety
of national interests. Coercive, mimetic and normative transmission mechanisms asso-
ciated with the diffusion of US MNCs or the fledgling EBS are unlikely to converge
on a centrally determined European approach or one premised on the economic
advantages associated with the ABS. Hence, functionalist arguments that emphasise
the competitive isomorphic tendency towards Americanisation (or Europeanisation)
are less than satisfactory (see Whitley, 2000: 114). Our empirical material detailed in
the next part of the article suggests that while some institutional isomorphism may
be in evidence across national varieties of capitalism within the EU, the degree of
managerial permissiveness therein is evidence of differences between national varieties.
Equally, the ABS while market-orientated is equally permissive in approaches to IR
at the level of the firm.
 
AMERICANISATION, EUROPEANISATION AND FIRM-LEVEL 
IR SYSTEMS
 
As we suggested last year the relationship between macro-level pressures such
as internationalisation, reform and restructuring in business systems and the
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.
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relationship of these to changes and developments in firm-level IR settlements is
not a direct process of transmission but on that must take account of socially
embedded market institutions therein. The discussion and evaluation of American-
isation and its more immediate manifestation in the emergence of shareholder
value approaches to corporate governance is problematic precisely because much of
this discussion is couched in general analysis of pressures on systems that are likely
to result in some discernible pressures on job regulation at the level of the firm. As
we have previously argued, any assessment of shareholder value and associated
developments in corporate governance and IR at the level of the firm must recogn-
ise that the term is loosely even vaguely defined, is imprecise and more recently
openly contested. For example, Caterpillar, the world’s largest manufacturer of con-
struction equipment, has recently faced a shareholder challenge fronted by trade
union pension funds who aim to ensure that Directors are appointed only on the
basis of majority voting. More significantly than the challenge is the fact that it is
supported by Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, two influential
US voting agencies more usually associated with the pursuit of shareholder returns
than the interests of special-interest groups such as trade unions and pension funds
(Tucker, 2005). In contrast to this case in Germany Daimler Chrysler’s largest
shareholder Deutsche Bank has openly criticised the poor value and performance
of the company, in particular its lack of strategy and more open short-termism
(Milne, 2005). Technological convergence and associated market pressures to con-
tain costs are assumed by convergence theorists to stimulate a convergence of
organisational structures within MNCs whereby centrally determined operational
targets assume the character of those found in US MNCs. Such ‘coercive compari-
sons’ are easy to cite yet the literature suggests that they are likely to be ‘sector-
specific’ rather than ‘system-generalisable’; for example, Royle (2004) reports that
the entry of American quick food retailers in Germany and Spain has led to the
Americanisation (greater product standardisation, use of non-union labour, lower
pay and lower trust relations) of those sectors in these business systems. Further-
more, Coller and Marginson (1998) argue that coercive and mimetic benchmarking
within MNCs is used to identify best practice internally not externally across a
particular sector. Nonetheless, as a competitive generalisation the emergence of
shareholder value approaches tighten the reins of corporate centralisation, inevita-
bly leading to a reduction in subsidiary autonomy. It follows from this that the
country-of-origin effect whereby US MNCs seek to diffuse practices associated
with the ABS into subsidiaries of US MNCs in Europe is a potentially significant
driver of change but so too must be the impact of host country pressures for
change or stability, be they determined at firm level, system level or European
level. That is, the country-of-origin effect has an impact on the competitive envi-
ronment where subsidiaries are located but in addition the host environment may
also have an impact on the practices of US MNCs. We seek to evaluate this argu-
ment in the next part of the article where we summarise recent developments origi-
nating in national business systems that may facilitate changes in the way firms
manage IR. Here we concentrate on what our empirical material tells us about
established patterns of IR management in subsidiaries of US MNCs. This will
enable us to evaluate the extent to which the pressures for competitive isomor-
phism at the level of the system are ahead of those for institutional isomorphism at
the level of the firm, a development that may indicate a pattern of internal diver-
gence and variation in IR arrangements between and within European nations.
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Empirical findings on firm-level IR systems in subsidiaries of US MNCs in the UK, 
Ireland and Germany
 
Our empirical material examines established approaches to IR in these countries,
particularly the profile of collective bargaining in national systems and subsidiaries of
US MNCs and comments on institutional challenges to firm-based employment sys-
tems in relation to established approaches. Our reasoning for seeking these distinctions
follows the arguments of Marginson and Sisson (2004: 12) who, like us, suggest that
competitive isomorphism at the system level, that is a movement towards American-
isation, could at firm level lead to the break-up of collective bargaining and a weakening
of trade unions as institutional stakeholders. More specifically, it is an open question
as to whether the embryonic EBS can retain any systematic coherence when changes
and developments in IR are institutionalised by individual firms at national level.
Table 1 presents the findings for the Irish and German subsidiary form, alongside
the British data reported in more detail in last year’s contribution.
In our previous analysis of the UK data (Clark and Almond, 2004), we argued that
pressures captured under the ‘shareholder value’ label, alongside product market
change and globalisation, had been more significant in provoking changes in the
nature of the broader firm-level (or in some cases, subsidiary level) human resource
(HR) management system than in the formal collective IR architecture within the
subsidiaries. In other words, challenges to existing collective IR settlements had been
limited, but this had not prevented a clear shift away from sophisticated paternalism
and towards policies of an increasingly ‘hard’, ‘performance-driven’ flavour.
In adding Irish and German material to the analysis, we are able to supplement this
picture, in order to gain a better perspective on the extent to which the relative stability
of collective IR among the UK subsidiaries was a host country-specific finding,
perhaps related to the comparative lack of constraints which pluralist arrangements
in the UK present to global employers.
The Irish case is of interest both in terms of its similarities to the UK context and
in certain significant differences. The centrally negotiated accords between the national
‘social partners’, which have characterised Irish IR for almost two decades, cover
almost all unionised workers in the country, and influence wage setting among non-
union firms. The firm-level IR system is voluntaristic in nature, although the pluralist
tradition tended historically to ensure that most incoming MNCs recognised unions.
Among our five Irish cases, however, there has been a substantial shift in the
direction of non-union arrangements. Of the three firms whose initial investment in
Ireland was before 1970, Pharmaco and Healthco followed the typical pattern of
subscribing to collective bargaining, in line with government policy, although ITCo,
which as can be seen from Table 1 is untypical in the long-lasting cohesion of its global
non-union employment system did not. The two 1990s entrants, Compuco and Logis-
tico, have both established largely non-union systems, although Logistico has been
forced to concede recognition at the margins. Additionally, in recent years, as their
investments in Ireland have grown, the corporate non-union preferences of companies
such as Pharmaco and Healthco have been reflected in policy in their newer sites. In
Healthco, all three of its more recently established Irish facilities operate on a non-
union basis, as does Pharmaco’s newest facility. Both these cases (as well as the
somewhat different case of Logistico) are examples of ‘double-breasting’ arrange-
ments whereby multi-plant organisations recognise trade unions and engage in collec-
tive bargaining in some plants but not in others (Beaumont and Harris, 1992; Kochan
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.
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et al
 
., 1986). There is, more generally, a progressive trend of increased union avoidance
among MNCs in Ireland.
US MNCs have presented the most direct challenge to the existing IR system in
Germany, with both the sectoral bargaining system, and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
the system of codetermination being targets of policy change among some of our case
study firms in the 1990s. While some US MNCs with relatively small German oper-
ations, such as EngCo2 and Household, have long avoided engagement with the
sectoral system, in two of our other cases (ITCo and CPGco) the subsidiaries have
taken the fairly radical step of changing their IR sector in order to secure a more
favourable agreement. The direct driver in both these cases appears to have been
flexibility, specifically the ability to relate a higher proportion of pay to performance
and to avoid reductions in the length of the working week at the beginning of the
1990s. This new-found active intolerance of existing sectoral structures may well have
been related to what the firms saw as necessary changes to HR management systems
in the wake of restructuring, although here, as elsewhere, the erosion of the host’s IR
system may have played a part in allowing subsidiary managers to make changes in
an opportunistic manner. Works councils do not appear to have been challenged in
any direct manner. Our German respondents contend that their American counter-
parts mistrusted the concept of works councils, their sclerotic effect on German
management decision making in particular was mentioned more than once by UK
respondents in non-union companies. In addition to this some British managers felt
that the German works council was sometimes used as an excuse by German managers
for delaying the introduction of corporate policies with which they disagreed. In
contrast to this German subsidiary managers were, on the whole, content with how
their, fairly cooperative, works councils operated within their own firms.
In the face of relatively little legislative reform at state level, a recent trend in the
German IR system has witnessed the greater use of concession bargaining and so-
called employment ‘pacts’ between firms and unions in order to lower labour costs
and facilitate greater flexibility (EIRR, 2003). A practice first highlighted by Hassel
(1999) these pacts witness the decentralisation of collective bargaining from sector
level to firm level to erode the established division of labour between collective bar-
gaining and works councils that negotiate the implementation of bargaining agree-
ments at plant level. Daimler-Chrysler, the department store chain Karstadt, the
General Motors subsidiary Opel, Siemens and Volkswagen have each negotiated pay
freezes and longer hours. Similarly, Debis (the Daimler Chrysler Services Group)
recently negotiated collective agreements incorporating new forms of profit-related
pay and Deutsche Telekom has recently negotiated the innovation of variable pay and
negotiated pay agreements related to the performance of the firm. This development
has led some commentators to argue that not only are the incomes of German workers
being marketised the process of decentralisation reduces the significance of collective
bargaining as pay increases and earnings are increasingly in the hands of company-
level works councils (Jackson 
 
et al
 
., 2005).
 
AMERICANISATION OR EUROPEANISATION? CHANGE, INNOVATION 
AND INTERNATIONALISATION IN EBSs
 
A basic premise of much of the research on MNCs is that they are embedded within
the institutions, associated practices and contemporary dynamics of their national
business system. Following on from this, MNCs are likely to transfer aspects of
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.
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nationality (both institutionally and culturally) to overseas operations. In the contem-
porary period an increasingly internationalised economic system appears to be dom-
inated by the USA, a position that has since the 1950s encouraged other national
business systems to ‘import’ American approaches to business in general and indus-
trial relations specifically (Clark, 1999; Dunning, 1998; Ferner, 2003; Gilpin, 2000).
For example, in the contemporary period current influences within the ABS such as
shareholder value approaches to corporate structure and governance are often pre-
sented as a dynamic efficiency-bearing characteristic of the ABS and US MNCs
(Edwards, 2004; Geppart, 2005; Grahl and Teague, 2004). However, there are ques-
tions over the extent to which shareholder value approaches can be effectively trans-
mitted and diffused into EBSs either by US MNCs or by indigenous firms without
substantive reform of EBSs (Gooderham 
 
et al
 
., 1999; Jones and Bacon, 2004).
As the material in the previous part of the article demonstrates, in many cases firm-
level IR systems in subsidiaries of US MNCs may represent patterns of embeddedness
that deter fully fledged movement to shareholder value approaches (see also Ferner
 
et al
 
., 2004). If, as this finding implies, the pressures for competitive isomorphism at
the level of the business system are running ahead of pressures for institutional
isomorphism at the level of the firm, it confirms continuing variation within national
IR systems to suggest both converging and diverging trends within national business
systems (see Katz and Darbishire, 2000). In the remainder of this article we summarise
some recent competitive pressures that have resulted in legislative reform or sustained
business pressures in the business systems under consideration.
 
Competitiveness and productivity
 
The American model of business and employment emphasises individualism, individ-
ual initiative, flexible unregulated labour markets and low taxation, particularly pay-
roll taxes. In contrast to this the European model emphasises collectivism, regulated
labour and product markets, higher taxation and a comparatively generous welfare
state. The European model appears problematic to sclerotic, the Lisbon strategy is
now associated with missed targets and a failure of political will whereas the American
model continues to create employment and sustain higher levels of labour productivity
and lower unit labour costs [see Table 2 and International Monetary Fund (IMF),
2005]. Although often cited this point is controversial; data for hourly productivity
indicate that several European countries outperform the ABS, especially once the ‘new
economy’ [IT start-ups and dotcom boom are removed from long-term trends (Jacoby,
2005: 41; Nolan and O’Donnell, 2003: 497)]. The key difference between European
employees and those in the ABS centres on the number of hours worked, a point noted
by many ‘no’ voters in the EU Constitution referendum in France and the Nether-
lands. The controversial point about this revolves around whether or not preference
for shorter working hours is a weakness or strength of continental European econo-
mies. Hence, the ABS appears more competitive and productive than European econ-
omies prompting American-dominated international institutions such as the IMF and
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to argue that in
order the achieve American-style living standards it is essential for European states
(including the UK) to liberalise labour markets. For France this would result in a
lower national minimum wage for young workers and an extension to the 35-hour
working week, for Germany it would require a significant reduction in income tax and
an equally significant reduction in unit labour costs. The American Chamber of
Commerce in Germany reports that high costs and rigid labour market regulations
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are driving US manufacturers out of the country. A survey commissioned by
AMCham found that while 40 per cent of US MNCs in the survey planned to increase
investment in Germany this year, 25 per cent said that despite this their investment in
labour-intensive production and administrative facilities such as call centres would be
reduced and redirected further east to lower labour cost economies such as Poland
and other Baltic states (AMCham, 2005). This development appears to challenge the
previously accepted arguments that US MNCs prefer to avoid trade unions and
collectively regulated state institutions but less so in the case of Germany. Therein the
evidence suggests that many US MNCs were prepared to tradeoff higher labour costs
associated with such institutions against higher levels of labour productivity that could
generally be expected in the German business system (Cooke and Noble, 1998).
In the UK the pressures associated with competitiveness and productivity centre
on the so-called burden of red tape and regulation. In particular, employer bodies
have lobbied the European Commission for lighter regulation in relation to the
recently introduced Information and Consultation Directive and the anti-competitive
effects of ending the UK’s opt-out from the upper hours limit in the working time
directive, in respect of both directives the strongest opposition came from the manu-
facturing sector. In response to a British delegation that included the British Chamber
of Commerce, the Federation of Small Businesses and the Institute of Directors,
Gunter Verheugen, the EU competition commissioner stated that each new European
law, particularly employment regulations, would be judged on how they affected SMEs
(
 
Financial Times
 
, 2004). Despite these arguments the evidence gathered in the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry (DTI)’s own report 
 
UK Competitiveness: Moving to the
Next Stage
 
 (DTI, 2003) suggests that the UK has the lowest rate of labour and product
market regulation in the OECD area and one of the highest levels of labour force
utilisation in the OECD. In effect the report—written in the main by Michael Porter—
suggests that the UK is more Americanised (more deregulated) than other European
economies. As a result of this the UK is less capable of competing effectively in the
knowledge economy because of weaknesses in British management, national training
initiatives and role of the government in remedying these defects.
In contrast to the position of Germany and the UK, Ireland has come from a
position where it lagged significantly behind the UK, Western Europe and the USA
on all indices of economic development [gross domestic product (GDP), gross national
product (GNP) per capita, productivity, living standards, etc.] to a situation where,
over the past decade, it has reached or passed all of these, except the USA. One of
the major reasons for this convergence is Ireland’s export performance, particularly
in certain high-technology sectors. Because these sectors are mostly dominated by
multinational subsidiaries, and because the USA is the major source of FDI, it is
widely accepted that US MNCs have been a major driver of economic performance,
including sustained productivity growth.
Independent evaluations of productivity changes in Ireland indicate a picture of
steady and more recently spectacular growth. For example, Cassidy (2004) found that
over the period 1961–2002, real GDP growth in Ireland averaged 4.75 per cent per
annum (p.a.) compared with 3 per cent in the EU and 3.5 per cent in the USA. We
find a similar picture in regard to labour productivity
 
1
 
 (GNP per worker), which
 
1
 
Numerous commentators have suggested that GNP is a more valid measure of economic performance in
Ireland because it excludes the large profit repatriation of foreign-owned MNCs. We should also caution
that productivity levels in Ireland are likely to be artificially inflated by the transfer pricing activities of
these MNCs.
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increased at an average rate of 2.75 per cent p.a. over the period, similar to the EU
average. However, the rate of increase since 1980 was 2.5 per cent p.a. compared with
1.75 per cent in the EU. Largely due to strong growth during the 1990s, labour
productivity in Ireland has risen dramatically relative to the EU and the USA (see
Table 2).
Much of the growth in Irish productivity is attributed to foreign direct investment
(FDI), particularly US FDI. In assessing the Irish experience in regard to productivity
growth, MIT economist Paul Krugman (1997: 43) comments:
 
To some extent, however, Ireland’s favourable productivity performance is surely a result of its success
in becoming the premier European host to inward foreign direct investment. [US FDI is 50 per cent
higher per capita than in the UK, six times as high as in France or Germany.]
 
Ireland’s reliance on FDI is well documented and the USA is by far the largest source,
accounting for just under half  of all foreign-owned firms. OECD (2000) data indicate
that US FDI into Ireland increased by a factor of five over the period 1990–98, while
the 
 
Economist
 
 (1997) found that FDI stock from US firms amounted to $3,000 per
head in Ireland, compared with $2,000 per head in the UK, $500 in Germany and
$200 in Spain. The great bulk of this investment is located in a small number of high-
technology sectors, notably electronics, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, software and
internationally traded services. These MNCs are almost exclusively export-orientated
(95 per cent in US plants). Looking specifically at US FDI, Barry (1999) found that
US plants in Ireland tend to be much larger, five times more productive, and eight
times more profitable. Not surprisingly, the FDI sector has higher skill levels than
indigenous firms (cf. Barry, 1999; 2002).
 
Shareholder value and organisational capabilities
 
In our last year’s review we stated that ‘the emergence of shareholder value and more
determined short-termism within British subsidiaries of US MNCs is only as signifi-
cant as the existing pressures on indigenous firms embedded within the British busi-
ness system’ (Clark and Almond, 2004). In contrast to this the Irish data are
 
Table 2: Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita [in 
purchasing power standard (PPS)], US 
 
=
 
 100
 
GDP per capita 
1970 2000
Germany 78.7 74.2
Ireland 41.9 81.7
Spain 49.8 57.5
UK 70.8 70.2
EU-15 69 70.3
USA 100 100
 
Source: Sapir 
 
et al
 
. (2004).
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inconclusive on this issue. What we do find though, is a pattern in increasing corporate
control over HR and other aspects of subsidiary-level management. Much of this
entailed an increased level of performance measurement, so that subsidiaries had to
regularly supply information on a wide range of metrics, most focused on financial
and operational performance and allowing a greater degree of comparison of perfor-
mance across subsidiaries. The HR agenda is increasingly focused on performance
improvement, using a series of metrics to evaluate and push this agenda. ITCo was
probably the most extreme. Many of the HR policies were focused on encouraging
and developing a ‘high performance orientation’, aided by the use of a range of
performance metrics applied at individual, team, department and establishment level.
The company’s Irish operations represent quite pressurised work contexts with high
expectations and goals set at various levels down to individual employees.
On a related theme, it would appear that changes in the structure of corporations
have focused on lessening dependence on particular subsidiaries and increasing mar-
ket competition within the corporation. This would appear to have altered the IR
power balance, a development particularly evident in regard to Pharmaco. Here
Pharmaco 1 (its major manufacturing plant), which had for many years occupied a
critical position in the corporation’s production chain, has now seen this change:
 
In 1972 Pharmaco #1 made 40 per cent of the active ingredient worldwide. This often led to IR trouble,
strikes and pay claims. They [unions/employees] could shut you down. It also led to the high pay and
benefits. But since the acquisitions there are now 16 [manufacturing] plants. I have talked to them [union
representatives] about ‘relative attractiveness’. There are guys sitting down in New York and deciding
where to put new investment. [They] now have 16 choices. The days of IR trouble are disappearing.
Competition is more severe internally than externally [Irish team, Interview notes].
 
In summary, there are three important developments taking place which may well be
driven by more short-termist and shareholder value pressures. First, increasingly
levels of centralised (corporate) control, as manifested in increased reporting require-
ments/use of metrics to evaluate subsidiary performance and compare with other
subsidiaries (in Ireland it would seem that ‘moving up the value chain’ is a double-
edged sword in regard to autonomy . . . as a site moves up it comes under greater
corporate surveillance and strictures). Second, structural changes/reorganisation to
lessen dependence on single sites and increase internal competition between sites for
new business. Third, increasing emphasis on continuous performance improvements
(again in regard to particular metrics, and incorporating global performance manage-
ment programmes).
In contrast to these firm-level innovations which may indicate more institutional
isomorphism in the Irish business system in the German business system recent
developments as we indicate above are more evident at the system level and challenge
existing patterns of corporate governance. Firstly, the German code of good practice
for corporate governance Dax, aims to develop greater financial transparency in large
German corporations, better information for capital and financial market actors and
a strengthening of shareholder rights. As a principle to govern corporate investments
shareholder value has been widely discussed by academics and practitioner bodies and
as a result many corporations quoted on the German stock market have changed their
reporting and accounting principles. This has put strains on the traditional stake-
holder orientation of German firms. However, the shorter-term orientation of con-
temporary German managers and a clearer concentration on shareholder interests,
for example, cost reduction-inspired lay-offs is still perceived as ‘American’ in Ger-
many (
 
Business Week
 
, 2004; FAZ, 2005). A consequence of the shifting balance
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between stakeholder and shareholder interests at corporate level has been an explicit
attack on codetermination (particularly corporate-level union representation on the
supervisory board) by employer associations and some economists who suggest that
German corporations need to follow the lead of US firms in Germany who are less
inclined to remain located in the German business system when there are clear cost
advantages to relocation in lower-cost states within and beyond the EU.
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
 
A review of this type blends empirical observation, commentary on recent institutional
and legislative developments and theoretical argument to provide a forum for further
development of themes, peer criticism and academic debate. Our major empirical
material, while limited to subsidiaries of US MNCs, is informative to our general
arguments because if  one is looking for the impact of Americanisation one might
expect to find its impact in subsidiaries of US MNCs. The diffusion of US MNCs
into Europe has provided a greater awareness of diversity in organisational forms,
principles of corporate governance and associated IR practices. This diversity of
practice illustrates variation which is the basis of the comparative institutional
approach wherein different economic, political and social advantages lead to multiple
patterns of viability and leverage in the global economy. The diffusion of US MNCs
tests the resilience of indigenous organisational forms, particularly in continental
Europe, in the face of apparently unstoppable convergence around one template for
enterprise-level best practice or global efficiency at system level.
The historical and contemporary evidence on the diffusion of ‘American’ business
and IR practice reveals a mixture of innovation and embedded patterns of local
isomorphism that has resulted in a pattern of incremental adaptation and hybridisa-
tion and continued diversity of national business systems (see Djelic, 1998; Ferner 
 
et
al
 
., 2004; Gooderham 
 
et al
 
., 1999; Mayer and Whittington, 2004). However, if  as our
empirical material on subsidiaries of US MNCs suggests they are not at the forefront
of a movement to more Americanised methods of management where are the pres-
sures for Americanisation coming from? Like some of the contributors to last year’s
review we have to follow the arguments of established economic sociologists (see
Smelser and Swedberg, 1994; Streeck, 1997) who argue that organisational actors—
states, the European Parliament and the European Commission, indigenous firms,
labour unions and financial institutions—while they react in a variety of ways to
globalisation that reflect the embeddedness of national patterns of institutional organ-
isation, may, over time, reposition themselves. That is, in the face of either sectoral
developments (Royle, 2004) or emergent system pressures (Grahl and Teague, 2004)
a pattern of regime fragmentation may be emerging across the EU whereby member
states may encourage institutional change beyond that formulated at EU level. It
follows from this that the sources of Americanisation are manifold in the EU; subsid-
iaries of US MNCs may diffuse practices associated with the ABS or more likely
diffuse the rhetoric of contemporary business strategies into general usage, sectors
dominated by US MNCs such as fast food are more likely to see substantive take-up
of lower road strategies. Similarly in Germany indigenous firms in the SME or Mit-
telstand sector are likely to deploy American-inspired approaches to people manage-
ment that are unavailable to larger German firms. At the level of the state nations
such as Ireland and Spain have for some time viewed MNCs as partners in economic
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development and pursued permissive export-led strategies towards FDI. Both coun-
tries have downplayed ownership issues to pursue full integration in the global econ-
omy and EU in exchange for economic growth and job creation. In many respects
Ireland is more Americanised than the UK, particularly in the weakness of its union
recognition legislation, but our evidence also points to a high level of variation in the
HR approaches used. For example, only one of the case firms studied (ITCo) seems
to ‘toe the corporate line’ in almost all aspects of HR. All of the other cases employed
HR approaches which in many regards accommodated their Irish host environment.
However, in all of the cases, certain aspects of the US business system were evident.
The US influence was most evident in the information and communications technol-
ogy firms, specifically in the performance management orientation, individualist
emphasis and eschewing of collective employee representation to the greatest degree
possible. In the pharmaceuticals and healthcare firms, the trend of union avoidance
in new plants, mentioned above, also reflects a strong country-of-origin influence
which is facilitated by the growing number of non-union firms, both indigenous and
foreign owned, in Ireland. Other areas where corporate influence seemed to pertain
include the issue of performance management, safety and quality management. On
the latter two issues, it is clear that sectoral factors are particularly important. In the
pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors, it is standard practice for auditors from Cor-
porate HQ to periodically visit the Irish subsidiaries to monitor the systems used. This
process of regular monitoring by HQ relates to the imperative to obtain/retain regu-
latory approval. However, in other aspects of HR practice, we found little evidence of
extensive corporate imposition of HR policies, procedures or practices in either
Healthco or Pharmaco.
Our investigations also indicate a time of significant change for US subsidiaries in
Ireland. In particular, we found a consensus among management, employees and trade
unions in all of the case firms that in order for the Irish operations to remain viable,
they must move up their corporation’s ‘value chain’, through engaging in higher value-
added activities, and concurrently improve their competitiveness (in terms of produc-
tivity, etc.). Ultimately, this means raising their profile at the corporate level and
convincing top management there of Ireland’s capacity to take on ‘higher order’
responsibilities (i.e. more complex, higher margin products). The Healthco case illus-
trates this position: the strategy of the Irish management team is twofold: (i) impress
HQ by performing well in relation to its current responsibilities and sending out Irish
managers to Corporate HQ to network and (ii) convince corporate management as
to Ireland’s capacity to take on new and more challenging product lines. To date the
Irish company has been remarkably successful with this strategy. The prospects for
the other MNCs in Ireland remain to be seen. The other key trend emerging in all of
the case firms is that of increasing corporate control—although this is probably least
discernible in ITCo, given its tradition of conforming to corporate policy in almost
all aspects of HR practice. Management respondents in Pharmaco, Healthco and
Compuco all spoke extensively about the progressive trend increasing corporate
involvement in the management of the Irish operations. While we are clearly in the
realm of speculation, it is our opinion that many Irish subsidiaries of US corporations
which have experienced many years of considerable HR autonomy are entering a
phase whereby they will be increasingly subjected to greater corporate control.
In conclusion, we can make four points. First, if  Europe is about economic perfor-
mance and the control of multinationals it is about the balance between economic
efficiency and industrial democracy and the balance between these is entangled in the
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.
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wants and aspirations of a previous era (Jones, 2004). As Jones states there is no easy
way to make the argument, developments in enterprise strategies appear to suggest
the logic of renegotiating pre-existing accommodations at system level, that is the
balance in national business systems in Europe is leaning towards economic efficiency
rather than industrial democracy associated with socially embedded market institu-
tions within member states in the EBS. Second, if  the first conclusion is true, what are
these enterprise developments and where do the sources of pressure come from?
Simplistically, one would expect them to come from the efficiency-spillover effects of
US MNCs because the enterprise developments—downsize and distribute models of
corporate governance, shareholder value or ‘Anglo-American’ methods are in large
measure associated with developments in the ABS. However, our empirical material
suggests that beyond stereotypical sectors such as fast-food US MNCs in Europe have
relatively permissive approaches to IR that in many cases accommodate host country
factors, particularly in Germany. Alternatively, as the editors argued last year, the
pressures are evident at the system level where more liberal permissive systems such
as Ireland and the UK lobby to maintain this liberalism and in contrast to this
German employers in a more coordinated and defensive system seek some form of
pathway adjustment to accommodate American FDI and facilitate contemporary
enterprise strategies in subsidiaries of US MNCs and indigenous firms. As we argue,
the renegotiation of existing accommodations is more system driven than US MNC
driven. Third, efficiency and industrial democracy are issues of distribution, here
employment rights are factored against their associated administrative and transac-
tion costs which reduce potential returns to investors. Across the EU the issue centres
on the cost of industrial democracy—the (so-called) burden of red tape—the costs of
enforcing and regulating employment rights and the cost of servicing such rights to
firms (set-up costs and overhead costs in personnel) and the consumer (higher prices
and the tax burden). The central argument we make here is what might be termed the
‘1992 election argument’—we all like the idea of workers in the EU being well treated,
etc. but like the idea of paying for it less so. By this we mean that the benefits to
workers of socially embedded market institutions such as IR systems cost money, for
example, in terms of regulation and enforcement and the costs associated with enact-
ing benefits such as maternity leave, reductions in employer flexibility imposed by
shorter qualification tenures for unfair dismissal and restrictions on working time.
Most right-minded individuals can in the abstract see the benefits to civil society of
such practices; however, when faced with the prospect of paying for them indirectly
via higher taxation or higher consumer prices the position becomes more complicated.
Employers rightly or wrongly complain about the costs of regulation which are in fact
paid by consumers directly and in some cases via redundancy as operations are moved
to lower-cost economies. It follows from this that much of the debate about regulation
and the utility of embedded social market institutions has developed within the EU,
for example, in the distinctly British view of the EU Constitution and the French and
Dutch view that it is too Anglo-American. Hence, the internal challenge to the EU
model of employment rights operates in addition to and independently of the chal-
lenge and pressures that might be associated with the direct and spillover effects of
US MNCs. Finally, the arguments and primary empirical evidence supported by
secondary empirical references in this article suggest that Americanisation and Euro-
peanisation are both moving targets at the level of national business systems. Subsid-
iaries of US MNCs export Americanness but accommodate Europeanness in varying
degrees as informed by the permissiveness or otherwise of the host business system.
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The EU expresses a coordinated union-wide approach to IR; however, the EU loosely
manages a continent, not a state, therefore member business systems retain their
national characteristics wherein reform, accommodation and permissiveness towards
EU directives, US MNCs and Americanisation is managed.
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